South Africa & The Great Depression

1. Introduction: The Global Conjuncture and the South African Anomaly

The economic history of the interwar period is dominated by the cataclysm of the Great Depression, a global contraction of liquidity, production, and trade that fundamentally reshaped the geopolitical and economic order of the twentieth century. Within this global narrative of collapse and destitution, the Union of South Africa presents a unique and paradoxical case study in macroeconomic divergence. While the industrialized economies of the North and the agrarian peripheries of the Southern Hemisphere spiraled into a prolonged crisis of accumulation, South Africa’s trajectory was bisected by a singular, transformative event: the abandonment of the gold standard in December 1932.

This decision cleaved the depression era into two distinct epochs: a period of devastating, self-inflicted deflationary stagnation (1929–1932) characterized by rigid adherence to monetary orthodoxy, followed by a period of unparalleled economic expansion (1933–1935) fueled by the revaluation of the nation’s primary export commodity, gold.¹ To understand the South African experience, one must first engage with the structural idiosyncrasies of its economy on the eve of the crisis. Unlike its fellow Dominions—Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—which were primarily exporters of agricultural commodities whose prices collapsed on world markets, South Africa possessed a counter-cyclical hedge in its vast gold reserves.² 

In a global deflationary environment, where the prices of goods and services fall, the real value of the monetary standard (gold) rises. Theoretically, South Africa should have been insulated from the worst ravages of the Depression. The fixed price of gold, combined with falling input costs (deflation), should have expanded mining profitability, cushioned the balance of payments, and provided a fiscal floor for the state. However, the historical record indicates that between 1929 and 1932, the South African economy suffered a severe contraction, characterized by capital flight, a liquidity crisis, amongst others.¹ 

This report argues that this contraction was not merely an imported contagion from the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange or the Credit Anstalt in Europe, but largely a crisis of political economy manufactured by the Pact Government of Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog. By choosing to defend the gold parity of the South African pound after the United Kingdom, the South African state subjected its domestic economy to crushing deflationary pressure in the name of economic independence.⁴

The subsequent reversal of this policy in late 1932 precipitated an economic boom that has few parallels in economic history. The "Gold Premium"—the windfall revenue generated by the devaluation of the currency relative to the metal—did not merely restore the status quo ante; it fundamentally altered the structural composition of the South African economy. It provided the fiscal capacity for the state to solve the socio-economic issues through aggressive industrial interventionism and public works, while simultaneously entrenching the proletarianization of the black labor force through the mechanisms identified by the Native Economic Commission (1930–1932).⁶

This analysis proceeds through a rigorous examination of these phases. It prioritizes macroeconomic variables—GDP growth, terms of trade, monetary aggregates, and fiscal balances—before turning to the profound social dislocations that these economic forces engendered. It posits that the Great Depression was the crucible in which the modern, industrial state was forged, converting mineral rents into a mechanism of social engineering and industrial diversification that would define the country’s trajectory for the remainder of the century.

2. The Political Economy of Pre-Crisis South Africa (1924–1929)

The severity of the shock that struck South Africa in 1929 can only be understood by dissecting the fragile political economy that preceded it. The election of the Pact Government in 1924, a coalition between the Afrikaner nationalist National Party and the English-speaking Labour Party, marked a decisive shift in economic policy from laissez-faire colonialism to state-directed interventionism aimed at protecting the white working class.⁸

2.1 The Minerals-Energy Complex and its Constraints

By the late 1920s, the South African economy was characterized by a sharp dualism. The minerals-energy complex (MEC), centered on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, was the engine of accumulation, generating the foreign exchange necessary to subsidize the rest of the economy. However, the industry faced significant constraints. Under the gold standard, the price of gold was fixed at the standard £4.24 per fine ounce.⁹ This meant that the industry had no pricing power; profitability was entirely a function of working costs.

The geology of the Witwatersrand further complicated this dynamic. The reefs were characterized by vast deposits of low-grade ore that were unpayable at the prevailing cost-to-price ratios. The Chamber of Mines, the cartel representing the mining houses, exerted immense pressure to minimize labor costs to bring this low-grade ore into production. This structural imperative for cheap labor had led to the explosive industrial conflicts of the early 1920s, culminating in the Rand Revolt of 1922, where white miners fought against the "dilution" of their ranks with cheaper black labor.⁸ 

The Pact Government ascended to power in the wake of this revolt, explicitly promising to protect "civilized" (white) labor standards against the market forces that favored cheaper black labor.

2.2 Agricultural Fragility and the "Bywoner" Crisis

While mining provided the revenue, agriculture provided the votes. The commercial farming sector, dominated by maize and wool production, was integrated into global markets but remained technically backward, capital-starved, and heavily indebted. The "platteland" (rural areas) was already in a state of slow-motion collapse before 1929. The subdivision of farms, lack of capital, and recurrent droughts had created a class of landless white tenant farmers ("bywoners") who were increasingly drifting to urban centers, ill-equipped for industrial employment.¹⁰

The state responded with the "Civilised Labour Policy," utilizing state-owned enterprises like the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) to absorb these unskilled white workers at wages significantly higher than the market rate for unskilled black labor.¹¹ This effectively functioned as a welfare transfer system, subsidized by the revenues generated by the mining sector.

2.3 Fiscal Architecture and Protectionism

The Union’s fiscal stability was dangerously correlated with import duties and mining taxation.¹³ To diversify the economy and reduce dependence on wasting mineral assets, the Pact Government passed the Customs Tariff Act of 1925.⁸ This legislation moved beyond revenue tariffs to protective tariffs, designed to foster import substitution industrialization (ISI) in sectors like footwear, textiles, and confectionery. This policy signaled the state's intention to utilize mining surpluses to engineer a diversified industrial base, a strategy that would become the cornerstone of the post-1933 recovery. However, in 1929, the manufacturing sector remained nascent, contributing less than 15% to GDP and heavily reliant on imported inputs.¹⁵

3. The Transmission of the Global Crisis (1929–1931)

The Great Depression did not arrive in South Africa via a stock market crash—the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) was relatively insulated from Wall Street speculation—but through the trade channel. The collapse in aggregate demand in the industrialized North precipitated a catastrophic fall in the prices of primary agricultural commodities, transmitting the deflationary shock directly to the South African periphery.¹⁶

3.1 The Collapse of Agricultural Export Prices

Between 1928 and 1932, the global pricing mechanism for primary products disintegrated. For South Africa, the impact was concentrated on wool (the second most important export after gold) and maize (the staple crop). The price per pound of grease wool fell from an average of 14.7d in 1928 to a low of 4.4d in 1932, a decline of nearly 70% in nominal terms.¹⁸ The maize market suffered a similar collapse, with prices falling below the cost of production and transportation, rendering export production economically irrational.

Table 1: Index of Agricultural Export Prices and Terms of Trade (Base 1928 = 100)

Commodity/Indicator	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
Wool Price Index	100	76	48	34	29
Maize Price Index	100	88	62	51	45
Hides & Skins Index	100	82	55	41	33
General Export Price Index (excl. Gold)	100	80	58	46	39

Source: Derived from Union Statistics for Fifty Years; Minnaar.¹⁹

The data in Table 1 illustrates the severity of the shock. By 1932, the average South African farmer had to produce nearly four times the volume of wool to generate the same revenue as in 1928. This collapse in income was exacerbated by the "Great Drought" of 1930–1933, one of the most severe meteorological events in the region's history.¹⁹ 

The coincidence of ecological and economic collapse devastated the rural economy. Farmers who had incurred mortgage debt to expand production in the buoyant 1920s faced immediate foreclosure. The Land Bank was inundated with requests for relief, but the sheer scale of the insolvency threatened the entire rural credit system.

3.2 The Terms of Trade Shock and the Multiplier Effect

While agricultural export values plummeted, the cost of imported manufactured goods—farm implements, fertilizers, and consumer durables—did not fall to the same extent. This deterioration in the terms of trade for the agricultural sector meant that the purchasing power of the non-urban population evaporated. The multiplier effect was severe: country storekeepers went bankrupt, rural attorneys and service providers lost their clientele, and demand for urban manufactured goods collapsed.¹

However, a crucial distinction must be made regarding the aggregate terms of trade for South Africa as a whole. Because gold accounted for more than half of export earnings, and the price of gold was fixed while import prices fell, the national terms of trade actually improved during the early phases of the Depression. This divergence created a schizophrenic economy: a devastated agrarian sector screaming for relief and devaluation, and a mining sector that was theoretically positioned for expansion, provided costs could be contained and the gold standard maintained. This economic dichotomy laid the foundation for the ferocious political battle over monetary policy that would consume the Union from 1931 to 1932.

3.3 The Decline in Manufacturing Output

The manufacturing sector, though protected by tariffs, was not immune to the collapse in domestic demand. As rural incomes vanished and the mining industry practiced extreme austerity to maintain dividends, the market for consumer goods contracted. Gross value added in manufacturing stagnated, and employment in the sector, particularly for semi-skilled white workers, came under pressure.¹⁵

4. The Monetary Crisis: Orthodoxy vs. Pragmatism (1931–1932)

The defining economic event of the South African Great Depression was not the Wall Street Crash of 1929, but the monetary crisis precipitated by the United Kingdom's abandonment of the gold standard on September 21, 1931. This event presented the South African government with a binary strategic choice: follow Sterling and devalue, thereby maintaining the competitiveness of agricultural exports to the British market, or remain on the Gold Standard and defend the currency's value.⁴

4.1 The Decision to Maintain Parity

The Hertzog government, driven by Finance Minister N.C. Havenga, chose to maintain the gold standard.

• Political Nationalism: Hertzog and the National Party viewed the gold standard as a symbol of South Africa’s sovereign independence. Following Sterling was perceived as an act of colonial subservience to the British Empire. "South Africa has attained her economic independence," Hertzog declared, framing the currency issue as a constitutional test of sovereignty.⁴ To devalue simply because Britain had mismanaged its finances was viewed as anathema to the nationalist project.

• Economic Rationale: The government argued that because South Africa was the world's premier gold producer, its currency should be linked to its primary product. They believed that devaluation would lead to imported inflation, hurting the cost of living for the white working class—a key constituency of the Pact Government. Furthermore, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) held high gold reserves (approximately 60% coverage in early 1932), leading policymakers to believe the currency was technically defensible against speculative attack.⁴

4.2 The Economics of Deflation

The decision to stay on gold while South Africa's major trading partner (Britain) and competitors (Australia, New Zealand) devalued had catastrophic economic consequences. The South African pound appreciated significantly against Sterling and other depreciated currencies.

• Export Crisis: South African agricultural exports to Britain immediately became 30-40% more expensive than those from Australia and New Zealand. South African wool, fruit, and maize lost their primary market overnight.¹ To compensate farmers, the government introduced export subsidies funded by a "primage" duty on imports, a clumsy fiscal intervention that introduced further distortions into the price mechanism.⁸

• Capital Flight: International and domestic investors realized that the maintenance of the gold parity was unsustainable in the long run. The political pressure from the mining industry and the agricultural sector was too great. This rational expectation triggered massive capital flight. Investors moved funds to London, anticipating that they could repatriate them later at a profit once the South African pound inevitably devalued. This drained the commercial banks of liquidity and forced the SARB to raise interest rates to defend the reserves, precisely when the contracting economy required monetary stimulus.¹

• Internal Deflation: To maintain the gold peg in the face of balance of payments deficits and capital flight, the government was forced to pursue contractionary fiscal and monetary policies. Wages were cut in the public sector, and public works were curtailed (initially), deepening the recession.

Table 2: Macroeconomic Indicators During the Gold Standard Crisis (1929–1932)

Indicator	1929	1930	1931	1932
Real GDP Growth (%)	-	-2.1	-6.8	-5.9
Imports (£ millions)	83.4	64.5	53.0	32.8
Exports (£ millions)	97.8	83.5	71.9	68.9
Wholesale Price Index	100	88	83	77
Commercial Bank Advances (£ mil)	48.2	45.1	42.8	36.5

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years; Franzsen & De Kock.⁴

Table 2 reveals the extent of the contraction. Imports collapsed by over 60% between 1929 and 1932, a reflection of vanished domestic purchasing power and the punitive surcharges imposed to protect the balance of payments. Commercial bank advances contracted sharply, indicating a credit crunch driven by the liquidity crisis. While other nations began to recover in 1932, South Africa touched its economic nadir, strangled by the orthodoxy of its own government.

4.3 The Select Committee on the Gold Standard (1932)

The intensity of the crisis led to the formation of a Parliamentary Select Committee in 1932 to review the policy. The hearings became a battleground between orthodox economists (who supported the gold peg to prevent inflation and maintain creditworthiness) and the "devaluationists"—principally the Chamber of Mines and organized agriculture.

The Chamber of Mines presented a compelling technical argument: a devaluation would increase the Rand price of gold, instantly rendering vast reserves of low-grade ore profitable.² This would extend the life of the mines, expand employment, and increase the total volume of gold produced, thereby stimulating the entire economy. The government and the orthodox economists countered that the benefits of a premium would be short-lived, that costs would rise to meet the new price level (inflation), and that the wage-earner would be impoverished. The Committee’s report, released in mid-1932, upheld the government's stance, a triumph of political will over economic reality.²

This resistance created the "South African Paradox": an economy strangled by the abundance of its own primary asset. While the "Kemmerer-Vissering" commission of the mid-1920s had established the SARB and committed South Africa to gold, the rigid adherence to this doctrine in the face of a changed global reality turned a recession into a depression.

5. The Turning Point: Devaluation and the "V-Shaped" Recovery (1932–1933)

The unsustainable pressure on the balance of payments, combined with the political intervention of Tielman Roos (a former Nationalist minister and judge who returned to politics to campaign for devaluation), finally forced the government's hand. The flight of capital in December 1932 became a torrent, threatening the complete collapse of the banking system. On December 27, 1932, South Africa abandoned the gold standard.¹

5.1 The Immediate Market Reaction

The effect of the devaluation was instantaneous and dramatic. The South African pound depreciated to parity with Sterling.

1. The Gold Price Shock: The price of gold in local currency jumped from the standard 85 shillings per fine ounce to over 120 shillings almost overnight. By 1934, it would reach 140 shillings.⁵

2. The Liquidity Flood: Capital that had fled to London flowed back into the Union, seeking exposure to the booming gold sector. The liquidity crisis at the commercial banks vanished, and interest rates plummeted.⁴

3. The Stock Market Boom: A massive bull market erupted on the JSE. The valuation of gold mining shares soared, creating a significant wealth effect for the investing class and providing capital for new mine development, particularly on the Far West Rand.²⁶

5.2 The Mechanics of the Recovery (1933–1935)

Unlike the United States, where recovery was a slow, grinding process hampered by policy inconsistency, South Africa experienced a V-shaped recovery that economists have described as "unparalleled".² The linkage of the SARB’s policy rate to the Bank of England allowed for a cheap money policy that fueled industrial expansion.

• Real GDP Growth: The economy rebounded from a contraction of 5.9% in 1932 to positive growth of over 10% in 1933 and subsequent years, one of the fastest rates in the world.²

• Fiscal Revolution: The devaluation solved the government's fiscal crisis overnight. The state moved quickly to capture a significant portion of the "windfall" profits of the mines, transforming the public finances from deficit to surplus.

6. Fiscal Policy and the "Gold Premium" (1933–1935)

The management of the "Gold Premium"—the difference between the old standard price and the new market price—became the central pillar of South Africa’s economic development strategy. The government did not allow the full benefit of the premium to accrue to mining shareholders; instead, it engineered a fiscal regime to redistribute these rents to the rest of the economy.

6.1 The Excess Profits Duty Act of 1933

Finance Minister Havenga introduced the Gold Mines Excess Profits Duty Act in 1933.⁶ This tax was designed to tax the "unearned increment" accruing to the mines solely due to the currency devaluation.

• The Formula Tax: Instead of a flat corporate tax, the state introduced a sophisticated sliding-scale formula. A representative simplification of the formula used during this period is:$$Y = 60 - \frac{360}{X}$$Where $Y$ is the percentage of profits payable as tax, and $X$ is the ratio of profit to recovery (profitability).6

• Behavioral Incentives: This formula meant that as profitability rose (due to mining high-grade ore), the tax rate rose disproportionately. Conversely, if a mine milled low-grade ore (reducing immediate profit margins), the tax rate fell. This explicitly incentivized the mining of lower-grade ore.

• Economic Impact: The "Low Grade Policy" had profound macroeconomic effects. It significantly extended the lifespan of the mines (by making vast low-grade deposits payable). While the volume of gold produced in ounces did not immediately spike (as mines processed more rock for the same amount of gold), the volume of ore treated increased massively. This required more labor, more dynamite, more timber, and more steel, driving a secondary industrial boom.⁶

6.2 Revenue Generation and Redistribution

State revenue from mining nearly doubled. In 1932, mining contributed approximately £4 million to the fiscus; by 1934/35, this had risen to over £13 million.¹³ This revenue provided the capital for the state's interventionist ambitions.

7. State Capitalism and Industrial Expansion (ISI)

The government utilized this fiscal surplus not merely to balance the budget, but to finance a structural transformation of the economy. The depression had exposed the vulnerability of relying solely on primary exports. The post-1933 period saw the state use mineral rents to foster a secondary industrial sector.

7.1 ISCOR and Strategic Industries

The South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation (ISCOR), established by the state in 1928, began production in 1934, perfectly timed to meet the demand from the booming mining sector.³¹ The gold boom provided the demand for structural steel (for new mine shafts and infrastructure) and the fiscal subsidies required to protect the infant industry from foreign competition.³²

• The Multiplier Effect: The establishment of ISCOR created a domestic ecosystem for heavy industry. By producing cheap steel locally, it lowered input costs for other manufacturers.

• ESCOM: The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) expanded rapidly to power the deepening mines and the new factories, cementing the "minerals-energy complex" as the dominant structure of the economy.

7.2 The Manufacturing Boom

The period 1933–1939 is often cited as the true industrial revolution of South Africa.

• Growth Statistics: The gross value of manufacturing output increased by approximately 100% between 1933 and 1939. Employment in manufacturing grew rapidly, absorbing both non-urban whites (often women in textiles) and increasingly, urbanizing blacks.³³

• Import Substitution: The devalued currency acted as a natural tariff, making imports more expensive and boosting local competitiveness. Combined with the specific duties of the Customs Tariff Act, this created a hothouse environment for light industry (textiles, food processing, footwear).¹⁴

8. Social Consequences

The macroeconomic recovery disguised—and in some ways exacerbated—deep sociological fissures. The Depression and subsequent recovery were experienced differently across racial lines, mediated by the state's interventionist policies.

8.1 The Carnegie Commission and Socioeconomic vulnerabilities amongst whites

In 1932, the Carnegie Commission published its report examining widespread economic hardship among segments of the white population, estimating that over 300,000 white South Africans were living in dire poverty.¹⁰ The Depression had accelerated the dispossession of the bywoner class, creating a festering social crisis that threatened white political hegemony.

• The Civilised Labour Policy in Action: The recovery allowed the state to implement the "Civilised Labour Policy" with renewed vigor. This policy mandated that state departments (particularly the Railways and Municipalities) replace "uncivilized" (cheap black) labor with "civilized" (expensive white) labor at higher wages.¹¹

• Statistics of Substitution: Between 1924 and 1933, the proportion of white employees on the South African Railways rose from 9.5% to 39.3%, while black employment fell from 75% to 48.9%.¹² The gold boom provided the subsidy required to pay these inflated wages, effectively functioning as a welfare transfer from the mining sector to the white working class. This secured the political loyalty of the white proletariat to the state.

8.2 The Native Economic Commission (1930–1932) and Black Immiseration

Parallel to the Carnegie Commission, the Native Economic Commission (NEC) of 1930–1932 investigated the economic condition of the African population. Its findings were stark: the Native Reserves (later Bantustans) were in a state of ecological and economic collapse due to overcrowding, overgrazing, and soil erosion.⁷

• Reserve Collapse: The Depression devastated the reserves. The collapse in wool prices hurt African peasant farmers as much as white farmers. Furthermore, the restriction on cattle movements due to disease (foot-and-mouth) destroyed the asset base of rural Africans.¹⁹ The NEC report dispelled the myth that the reserves provided a subsistence base for migrant workers; they were, in fact, net importers of food.

• Wage Repression on the Mines: The most striking feature of the recovery was the stagnation of black wages. Despite the gold price rising from 85s to 140s by 1934, black wages on the mines remained flat. In real terms, African miners' wages in the 1930s were lower than they had been in 1911.³⁶ The Chamber of Mines utilized the monopsony power of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) to cap wages, arguing that higher wages would reduce the supply of labor (the backward-bending supply curve theory) and render low-grade mines unviable.³⁷

Table 3: Comparative Wage Trends on Gold Mines (Annual Cash Earnings)

Year	White Miner (£)	Black Miner (£)	Ratio (White:Black)
1911	330	29	11.4 : 1
1931	370	31	11.9 : 1
1936	390	32	12.2 : 1

Source: Derived from Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines.³⁶

This data highlights a critical insight: the economic boom of 1933–1935 widened the racial inequality gap. The "Gold Premium" was shared between shareholders, the state, and white labor, while black labor—the primary factor of production—saw no real wage growth.

8.3 Urbanization and Spatial Segregation

Driven by rural collapse, Africans migrated to the cities in record numbers. This period saw the growth of urban slums like Rooiyard, documented by anthropologist Ellen Hellmann in 1934.

• The Birth of Soweto: The state used the revenue from the gold boom to initiate massive slum clearance programs. In 1932/33, the first residents were forcibly moved from inner-city slums to the new township of Orlando East.²⁵ This marked the beginning of the Soweto complex and the physical entrenchment of urban apartheid. The economic recovery thus funded the infrastructure of segregation.

9. Comparative Analysis: South Africa in the Global Context

When viewed comparatively, South Africa’s Great Depression experience diverges sharply from the United States and the United Kingdom.

• United States: Experienced a prolonged depression with a double-dip recession (1937). GDP did not recover to 1929 levels until roughly 1940. The recovery was hampered by banking failures and inconsistent monetary policy.⁴¹

• United Kingdom: Left gold early (1931), leading to a milder depression and earlier recovery, driven by housing and cheap money.⁵

• South Africa: Experienced a deeper trough (1931-1932) than necessary due to policy rigidity, but the recovery was more explosive than either the US or UK. From 1933 to 1936, South Africa was one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with real GDP growth rates exceeding 10% in some years.²

This divergence highlights the "Lottery of the Commodity." South Africa happened to specialize in the one commodity (gold) that serves as the global store of value during crises. Once the self-imposed monetary constraints were removed, the external demand shock that crushed other economies became a terms-of-trade windfall for South Africa.

10. Conclusion

The economic history of South Africa during the Great Depression is a narrative of structural rigidity giving way to opportunistic expansion. The depression of 1929–1932 was deepened by the Hertzog government's refusal to decouple from the gold standard, a decision motivated by a desire for political autonomy that ironically resulted in economic dependence on British capital markets post-1932.

However, the subsequent recovery (1933–1935) was transformative. The devaluation of December 1932 did not merely restore equilibrium; it fundamentally re-priced the nation's asset base. The "Gold Premium" created a fiscal surplus that the state successfully captured and deployed to engineer a new social and industrial order. This period cemented the "Pact" between the state and white labor, financed the rise of state capitalism (ISCOR), and funded the spatial and economic segregation of the black population (slum clearance and influx control).

Ultimately, the Great Depression forced the state to intervene in the economy on an unprecedented scale, establishing the mechanisms of control—over currency, agricultural pricing, labor mobility, and industrial production—that would define the country’s development for the remainder of the twentieth century. The boom of 1933 proved that in the South African context, economic growth and widening racial inequality were not contradictory forces, but mutually aligned outcomes of a mineral-based accumulation strategy.

Citations used in report: ¹

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